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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that the United States, in opposing Iran’s suspected development 
of nuclear weapons, decides that the best way to halt or slow Iran’s program is 
to undermine the Iranian banking system, calculating that the ensuing financial 
pressure would dissuade or prevent Iran from continuing on its current course. 
And further suppose that the United States draws up the following four options, 
all of which are believed likely to produce roughly the same impact on Iran’s 
financial system and have similar effects on Iran’s economy and population: 
 
(1) Military air strikes against key Iranian banking facilities to destroy some 
of the financial system’s physical infrastructure; 
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(2) A regulatory cut-off of Iranian banks from the U.S. financial system, 
making it difficult for Iran to conduct dollarized transactions;1 
(3) Covert flooding of the Iranian economy with counterfeit currency and 
other financial instruments; 
(4) Scrambling Iranian banking data by infiltrating and corrupting its 
financial sector’s computer networks. 
 
Which of these options constitute uses of force, subject to the U.N. Charter’s 
prohibitions and self-defense provisions? 
I pose this set of hypothetical options for several reasons. First, it is an 
exercise in legal line drawing. The development and deployment of new 
technologies—both their offensive potential and the vulnerabilities they create 
for states reliant on those technologies—raise questions about permissible 
versus impermissible modes of interstate conduct and conflict. Military attacks 
are generally illegal, with exceptions for self-defense or when authorized by the 
U.N. Security Council.2 Most economic and diplomatic measures, even if they 
exact tremendous costs on target states (including significant loss of life), are 
generally not barred by the U.N. Charter, though some of them may be barred 
by other legal principles.3 Where along the spectrum of permissible to 
impermissible conduct do various types of cyber-attacks lie? 
Definitions of cyber-attacks vary, and the range of hostile activities that 
can be carried out over information networks is immense, ranging from 
malicious hacking and defacement of websites to large-scale destruction of the 
military or civilian infrastructures that rely on those networks. By “cyber-
attacks” I mean efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or 
networks or the information or programs on them,4 which is still a broad 
category. That breadth—encompassing activities that range in target (military 
versus civilian, public versus private), consequences (minor versus major, 
direct versus indirect), and duration (temporary versus long-term)—is part of 
what makes international legal interpretation or regulation in this area so 
difficult. 
Global interconnectedness brought about through linked digital 
information networks brings immense benefits, but it also places a new set of 
offensive weapons in the hands of states and nonstate actors, including terrorist 
groups.5 Military defense networks can be remotely disabled or damaged.6 
 
 1. For a discussion of this capability, see Juan C. Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies: 
Smart Financial Power and National Security, WASH. Q., Oct. 2009, at 43. 
 2. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. 
 4. This definition is based heavily on the one used in COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION 
AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 10-11 (2009) [hereinafter NRC COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 5. Estimates vary widely about the threat of cyber-attacks and cyber-war. Former Director of 
National Intelligence Michael McConnell argues that “[t]he United States is fighting a cyber-war today, 
and we are losing. . . . As the most wired nation on Earth, we offer the most targets of significance, yet 
our cyber-defenses are woefully lacking.” Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-War, Look to the Cold 
War, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B1. Others experts believe that cyber-espionage—stealing 
government and corporate secrets through infiltration of information systems—is a major challenge, but 
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Private sector networks can be infiltrated, disrupted, or destroyed.7 “Denial of 
service” attacks—flooding an Internet site, server, or router with data requests 
to overwhelm its capacity to function—can be used to take down major 
information networks. This method of attack was demonstrated in Estonia (one 
of the most “wired” nations in the world) during a period of diplomatic tensions 
with Russia in 2007,8 when such attacks disrupted government and commercial 
functions for weeks, including banking, media, and communications.9 More 
recently, it has been widely reported that a computer code dubbed Stuxnet, 
perhaps created and deployed by the United States or Israel, infected and 
significantly impaired Iran’s uranium enrichment program by disrupting parts 
of its control system.10 
The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies recently 
highlighted “the growing consensus” that future conflicts may feature “the use 
of cyber-warfare to disable a country’s infrastructure, meddle with the integrity 
of another country’s internal military data, try to confuse its financial 
transactions or to accomplish any number of other possibly crippling aims.”11 A 
 
that threat assessments of major cyber-attacks are overblown. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Online 
Threat, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 2010, at 44, 48. 
 Many experts assess that terrorist or criminal groups pose cyber-threats, too, but that for now the 
greatest potential for damage through cyber-attacks lies with a handful of states. See CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 13 (2008), available 
at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securingcyberspace_44.pdf (“Our most dangerous 
opponents are the militaries and intelligence services of other nations. They are sophisticated, well 
resourced, and persistent. Their intentions are clear, and their successes are notable.”); Bill Gertz, China 
Bolsters for “Cyber Arms Race” with U.S., WASH. TIMES, May 12, 2009, at A1 (discussing Russia and 
China as the main peers to the United States in cyber-warfare capability). This is not to deny that 
terrorist or criminal groups also pose a significant threat. See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New 
Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 97, 101. Thus far, however, 
terrorist groups have focused their cyber-activities on propaganda. See War in the Fifth Domain: Are the 
Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons of Conflict?, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010, at 25, 27. The 
possibility that terrorist groups or other nonstate or private actors might resort to cyber-attacks would 
also raise questions of state attribution. For example, questions arise as to whether actions by nonstate 
actors may legally be imputed to a state that allowed the cyber-attacks to occur in its territory or 
supported the attackers in other ways. The fact that a state may use a third-party state’s territory, 
infrastructure, or information systems as part of an offensive or defensive cyber-operation also 
implicates a host of self-defense issues and questions under neutrality law. For a discussion of these 
issues, see Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force 
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 232-39 (2002); see also infra note 171 
(noting issues involved with attempting to attribute nonstate actors’ attacks to state supporters). 
 6. See Lynn, supra note 5, at 97. 
 7. For a discussion of offensive cyber-attack capabilities and scenarios, see id. at 100-01. 
 8. See Evgeny Morozov, The Fog of Cyberwar, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2009), http://www
.newsweek.com/2009/04/17/the-fog-of-cyberwar.html; John Schwartz, When Computers Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 1; Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar To Disable Estonia, 
GUARDIAN, May 17, 2007, at 1. 
 9. See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in 
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193-94 (2009). According to the Estonian Defense 
Minister, “All major commercial banks, telcos, media outlets, and name servers—the phone books of the 
Internet—felt the impact, and this affected the majority of the Estonian population. This was the first 
time that a botnet threatened the national security of an entire nation.” Joshua Davis, Web War One, 
WIRED, Sept. 2007, at 165, 165 (quoting the Estonian Defense Minister). 
 10. See Ken Dilanian, Iran and the Era of Cyber War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at A1; David 
E. Sanger, Iran Fights Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at 4. 
 11. Press Release, John Chipman, Dir.-Gen. & Chief Exec., Int’l Inst. for Strategic Studies, 
Military Balance 2010—Press Statement (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.iiss.org/publications/
military-balance/the-military-balance-2010/military-balance-2010-press-statement/. 
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U.N.-convened panel of governmental experts recently echoed that conclusion, 
noting that “existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security 
are among the most serious challenges of the twenty-first century. . . . Their 
effects carry significant risk for public safety, the security of nations and the 
stability of the globally linked international community as a whole.”12 In short, 
electronic and informational interconnectivity creates tremendous 
vulnerabilities, and some experts speculate that the United States may be 
especially at risk because of its high economic and military dependency on 
networked information technology.13 
Computer information system capabilities and vulnerabilities raise 
international legal questions of tremendous public policy import. What are the 
permissible uses of offensive cyber-capabilities? To what extent is existing 
international law adequate to regulate these capabilities today and in the future? 
And what international legal authority do states have to respond, including with 
military force, to cyber-attacks or cyber-threats by states or nonstate actors? 
Note that I am concerned here with jus ad bellum issues—including whether 
cyber-attacks constitute an act of aggression or would justify resort to armed 
force in response—but not jus in bello issues, that is, how the laws of war 
would govern the use of cyber-attacks during an ongoing armed conflict.14 
Besides illustrating some new interpretive challenges with regard to the 
U.N. Charter, another reason I pose the opening hypothetical is to illustrate that 
legal line drawing with respect to cyber-attacks will produce winners and 
losers, and to illuminate the implications of those disparate effects for 
international legal development. States have different capabilities and different 
vulnerabilities to those capabilities. Not all states, for example, have the 
financial and trade muscle to coerce other states economically, and states have 
varying strength to withstand economic pressure. The same is true of cyber-
attack and defense capabilities, so legal rules that affect the costs of using 
cyber-attacks have disparate strategic consequences. Legal line drawing with 
respect to the use of force and modes of conflict has distributive effects on 
power, and is therefore likely to be shaped by power relations.15 For major 
 
 12. See Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Dev. in the Field of Info. & Telecomm. 
in the Context of Int’l Sec., 65th Sess., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/65/201 (July 30, 2010). 
 13. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 18-20; Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Past, 
Present, and Future of Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 13 (2010). For a discussion of 
early U.S. government concerns about such vulnerabilities during the 1990s, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., 
How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007: A Warning from the Future, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 29, 
1996, at 22; and Mark Thompson & Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 
38. 
 14. For a discussion of jus in bello issues in relation to cyber-attacks, see, for example, NRC 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 262-68. In many future cases, the most vexing legal questions will 
not involve whether a cyber-attack alone is legally prohibited or justifies self-defense, but rather whether 
cyber-attacks are a legal means of engaging in a conflict that has already erupted. A useful illustration is 
Russia’s alleged cyber-attacks on Georgian public and private information networks during the 2008 
conflict amid significant conventional military operations. See 2 REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA 217-19 (2009), available at 
http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf. 
 15. For a discussion of the distributive effects of international use of force rules, see Matthew 
C. Waxman, Self-Defense and the Limits of WMD Intelligence, in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND LAW 14-15 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2010), available at http://www.hoover.org/taskforces/
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actors like the United States, aligning legal interpretation with strategic 
interests is exceptionally difficult because the future effects of information 
technology on power and conflict remain so uncertain. 
To better understand contemporary relationships between international 
law regulating force and cutting-edge technologies, this Article looks backward 
in time to international legal disputes and scholarly debates of the Cold War. A 
central theme is that these fundamental issues are not entirely new or unique to 
cyber-technology, even if they have new dimensions that make them harder to 
solve or navigate. Modes and technologies of conflict change, and the law 
adjusts with varying degrees of success to deal with them.16 Throughout the 
U.N. Charter regime’s sixty-plus years of development, the means by which 
states and international actors wage conflict has changed so dramatically that 
every so often major international legal figures debate whether the Charter’s 
most basic tenets are “dead.”17 Cyber-warfare capabilities and vulnerabilities 
will strain the Charter and its basic prohibition on force once again, and the 
lessons of history can help us understand how. 
This Article makes two overarching arguments. First, strategy is a major 
driver of legal evolution. Most scholarship and commentary on cyber-attacks 
capture only one dimension of this point, focusing on how international law 
might be interpreted or amended to take account of new technologies and 
threats. The focus here, however, is on the dynamic interplay of law and 
strategy—strategy generates reappraisal and revision of law, while law itself 
shapes strategy—and the moves and countermoves among actors with varying 
interests, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. The purpose is not to come down in 
favor of one legal interpretation or another, and the conclusions are necessarily 
speculative because no governments speak in much detail about their cyber-
warfare capabilities and strategies at this point. There are downside risks and 
tensions inherent in any plausible approach, though, and this analysis helps in 
understanding their implications. 
Second, it will be difficult to achieve international agreement on legal 
interpretation and to enforce it with respect to cyber-attacks.18 The current 
trajectory of U.S. interpretation is a reasonable effort to overcome the 
translation problems inherent in a U.N. Charter built for a different era of 
conflict. However, not only do certain features of cyber-activities make 
international legal regulation very difficult, but major actors also have 
divergent strategic interests that will pull their preferred doctrinal 
interpretations and aspirations in different directions, impeding formation of a 
 
national-security/challenges. 
 16. See Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99, 
114-15 (2002) (“The novelty of a weapon—any weapon—always baffles statesmen and lawyers, many 
of whom are perplexed by technological innovation. . . . [A]fter a period of gestation, it usually dawns 
on belligerent parties that there is no insuperable difficulty in applying the general principles and rules 
of international law to the novel weapon . . . .”). 
 17. See, e.g., David Wippman, The Nine Lives of Article 2(4), 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 387 (2007). 
 18. In that regard, I am less sanguine than scholars like Anthony D’Amato, who “predict[s] 
that attacks on the Internet will soon be seen as clearly illegal under international law” and suggests that 
“customary international law [may have] already reached that position.” Anthony D’Amato, 
International Law, Cybernetics, and Cyberspace, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 59, 67 (1999). 
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stable international consensus. U.S. policymakers should therefore prepare to 
operate in a highly contested and uncertain legal environment. The prescription 
is not to abandon interpretive or multilateral legal efforts to regulate cyber-
attacks; rather, it is to recognize the likely limits of these efforts and to consider 
the implications of legal proposals or negotiations in the context of broader 
security strategy. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II dissects a long-running debate 
over the meaning of “force” and “armed attack” in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, and examines the challenges of fitting cyber-attacks into existing 
legal categories. This Part does not offer a doctrinal conclusion about where the 
lines should ultimately be drawn, though it discusses the most salient merits 
and problems of alternative interpretations. Instead, this Part uses the 
hypothetical options laid out above as a way to illustrate the implications of 
competing interpretations, which echo past interpretive disputes. It also 
describes the general thrust of U.S. government doctrinal thinking about cyber-
warfare and the regulation of force, which emphasizes the effects of cyber-
attacks in analyzing whether they cross the U.N. Charter’s legal thresholds. 
Part III considers parallels between cyber-warfare and the “low-intensity 
conflict” or proxy warfare waged by the superpowers and their clients during 
the Cold War. As in that latter context, the low visibility of states’ moves and 
countermoves in cyberspace will slow the process of interpretive development. 
This Part draws on Cold War lessons to argue that Article 2(4) will probably be 
a weak constraint on offensive cyber-attacks because of, among other reasons, 
the difficulty of observing them and attributing them to their sources or 
sponsors. Those weaknesses will also likely plague any attempt to negotiate 
and enforce new international agreements limiting cyber-warfare. 
Part IV draws again on early Charter history to argue that interpretations 
of Articles 2(4) and 51 have distributive effects on power and therefore have 
strategic consequences. Rather than urging one interpretation or another, this 
Part aims to shed light on the strategic logic likely driving U.S. legal thinking, 
and it urges a more cautious and multidimensional assessment than is usually 
found in this burgeoning scholarly field. Whether emergent U.S. interpretations 
of the Charter serve U.S. interests or broader international societal goals of 
global order depends on the validity of assumptions about an unpredictable 
future security environment. 
II. ARTICLE 2(4) AND THE MEANING OF “FORCE” 
Modern legal regulation of the use of force begins with the U.N. Charter, 
specifically Article 2(4). That provision directs that “[a]ll Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”19 Article 51 of 
the Charter then provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the 
 
 19. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations.”20 Although there is significant debate 
about the scope of the self-defense right to resort to military force, it is 
generally agreed that Article 51 carves out an exception to Article 2(4)’s 
otherwise strict prohibition of force,21 and it is widely understood that “armed 
attack” is, although closely related, a narrower category than “threat or use of 
force.”22 
With respect to offensive cyber-capabilities and the U.N. Charter, then, 
these provisions raise two major issues. First, in terms of Article 2(4), might 
certain types of cyber-attacks constitute a prohibited “use of force”? This 
question has to do with whether the existing legal framework imposes 
significant constraints on hostile cyber-activities. Second, in terms of Article 
51, might a cyber-attack give rise to a right to use military force in response?23 
This question raises the additional issue of what remedies are available to states 
that suffer cyber-attacks or threats of them. 
A. Historical Divides over Charter Interpretation 
Article 2(4)’s express prohibition is both straightforward and ambiguous. 
It is direct and absolute on its face, yet, as Oscar Schachter observed, “[t]he 
paragraph is complex in its structure[,] and nearly all of its key terms raise 
questions of interpretation.”24 As the opening hypothetical helps illustrate, new 
technologies raise interpretive puzzles with echoes of previous eras. 
1. Force as Armed Violence 
The dominant view in the United States and among its major allies has 
long been that the Article 2(4) prohibition of force and the complementary 
Article 51 right of self-defense apply to military attacks or armed violence.25 
 
 20. Id. art. 51. 
 21. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND 
ARMED ATTACKS 45-52 (2002). 
 22. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 788, 796 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002). The U.S. position on this issue, which differs 
from that of many states and authorities, is discussed infra Section II.C. 
 23. For a survey of approaches to these legal questions, see Daniel B. Silver, Computer 
Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 
73 (2002). There is continuing debate about whether there is a gap between Articles 2(4) and 51, insofar 
as a use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) might not be sufficient to trigger a right to use military force 
in self-defense. See Randelzhofer, supra note 22, at 790. 
 24. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States To Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1624 
(1984). 
 25. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 253 (“Traditional [law of armed conflict] 
emphasizes death or physical injury to people and destruction of physical property as criteria for the 
definitions of ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack.’”); Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in 
Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 408-09 (1985) (describing two main 
interpretations of Articles 2(4) and 51, and arguing that only the one wherein “the only justification for 
force is prior (or imminent) armed force by one’s adversary” is logically sound); Albrecht Randelzhofer, 
Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 112, 117 
(noting that the term “force,” as used in Article 2(4) is, “according to the correct and prevailing view, 
limited to armed force”); Bert V. A. Röling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE 
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 3, 3 (A. Cassese ed., 1986) (“It seems obvious to 
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The plain meaning of the text supports this view, as do other structural aspects 
of the U.N. Charter. For example, the Charter’s preamble sets out the goal that 
“armed force . . . not be used save in the common interest.”26 Similarly, 
Articles 41 and 42 authorize, respectively, the Security Council to take actions 
not involving armed force and, should those measures be inadequate, to 
escalate to armed force.27 Moreover, Article 51 speaks of self-defense against 
“armed” attacks.28 There are textual counter-arguments, such as that Article 
51’s more specific limit to “armed attacks” suggests that drafters envisioned 
prohibited “force” as a broader category not limited to particular methods. 
However, the discussions of means throughout the Charter and the document’s 
negotiating history strongly suggest the drafters’ intention to regulate armed 
force differently and more strictly than other coercive instruments.29 This 
interpretation has generally prevailed over alternatives outlined below. 
Under the strictest version of this approach, only the first scenario 
described above—a military strike against Iranian banking facilities—could 
violate Article 2(4) (unless it were authorized by the Security Council or 
justified as self-defense) or could itself give rise to a right of armed self-
defense.30 The other scenarios (financial regulatory measures, covert economic 
disruptions, or computer network attacks) may or may not be unlawful under 
international law for other reasons,31 but only the first involves an attack with 
military violence. 
2. Force as Coercion 
Another view of Article 2(4) reads its purpose more expansively and 
looks not at the instrument used but its general effect: that it prohibits coercion. 
Armed force is only one instrument of coercion, and the easiest to identify. 
This interpretation of Article 2(4) stresses its purpose over its text. At various 
times, some states—usually those of the developing world, and, during the 
Cold War, often with Soviet bloc support32—pushed the notion that “force” 
 
the present writer that the ‘force’ referred to in Art. 2(4) is military force.”). 
 26. U.N. Charter pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. arts. 41-42. 
 28. Id. art. 51. 
 29. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International 
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 905 (1999); see also 
Marco Roscini, World Wide Warfare—Jus ad Bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, 14 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 85, 105 (2010) (noting that early Charter history and “[t]he travaux 
préparatoires also reveal that the drafters did not intend to extend the prohibition to economic coercion 
and political pressures.”). 
 30. Although this example raises a separate legal question as to whether such an attack on 
civilian infrastructure would violate the jus in bello principle of distinction, as previously mentioned this 
Article focuses on jus ad bellum issues. 
 31. See infra note 60; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27) (“The principle of non-intervention involves the right of 
every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference. . . . Expressions of an opinio 
juris regarding the existence of this principle . . . are numerous . . . .”). 
 32. For an influential Soviet perspective, see GRIGORI TUNKIN, LAW AND FORCE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (Progress Publishers trans., 1985). Tunkin wrote that “[i]n the literature of 
socialist states on international law a broad interpretation of force is defended, while a narrow 
interpretation of that concept prevails in the literature of capitalist states according to which ‘force’ in 
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includes other forms of pressure, including political and economic coercion 
threatening to state autonomy.33 Debates similar to that over the definition of 
“force” and “armed attack” in Articles 2(4) and 51 have played out in the U.N. 
General Assembly over the definition of “aggression,” with the United States 
and its Western allies pushing a narrow definition focused on military attacks, 
and developing states pushing an expansive definition including other forms of 
coercion or economic pressure.34 
Under this approach, any or all of the four hypothesized scenarios could 
conceivably constitute prohibited “force.” Each is intended and is likely to 
exert coercive pressure on Iran to forego its nuclear ambitions by exacting or 
threatening crippling costs to its financial sector. A further extension of this 
approach might go so far as to say that economic coercion could be so intense 
as to justify armed force in self-defense under Article 51.35 One problem with 
this approach has always been the difficulty of distinguishing unlawful 
coercion from lawful pressure. After all, coercion in a general sense is ever-
present in international affairs and a part of everyday diplomacy and 
statecraft.36 
3. Force as Interference 
A third possible approach to interpreting Articles 2(4) and 51 would focus 
on the violation and defense of rights—specifically, a state’s right of sovereign 
dominion. Such an approach ties the concept of force to improper interference 
with the rights of other states, focusing on the object and specific character of a 
state’s actions rather than a narrow set of means or their coercive effect.37 The 
 
the sense employed in the United Nations Charter refers only to armed force.” Id. at 82. He went on to 
write that “[t]here is no doubt that the use of economic force, for example, by one or more states against 
one or more other states may represent a very considerable threat to the political independence of states, 
particularly if they are small, and may produce a significant destabilisation of international relations 
. . . .” Id. However, the Soviet bloc did not always side with the developing world on these questions: 
“[I]n the realm of force two groupings (socialist and developing countries) tend to agree only up to a 
point, whereas on certain issues the goals and interests of the USSR coincide with those of the U.S. and 
a few Western Great Powers.” Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual 
Erosion of the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 
25, at 505, 508. 
 33. See AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT 
120, 234 (1980); Hans Kelsen, General International Law and the Law of the United Nations, in THE 
UNITED NATIONS: TEN YEARS’ LEGAL PROGRESS 1, 5 (1956) (“It is . . . quite possible to interpret this 
provision to mean the Members are forbidden not only to use armed force, but also non-armed force 
constituted by an illegal action directed against another Member without its consent . . . .”); 
Randelzhofer, supra note 22, at 118 (“The developing countries and formerly the Eastern bloc countries 
have repeatedly claimed that the prohibition of the use of force also comprises other forms of force, for 
instance, political and, in particular, economic coercion.”). 
 34. See JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS 115-36 (1977). 
 35. See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 113, 121-44 (1986) (discussing pressures to revise the limits on self-defense drawn by the U.N. 
Charter but arguing against moves to do so). 
 36. See Farer, supra note 25, at 406; Alexander L. George, Coercive Diplomacy: Definition 
and Characteristics, in THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 7, 7-11 (Alexander L. George & William 
E. Simons eds., 2d ed. 1994). 
 37. As Quincy Wright explained in 1960: 
Domain, like property in systems of national law, implies the right to use, enjoy and 
transfer without interference from others, and the obligation to each state to respect the 
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issue of “subversive intervention,” or interference with other states’ political 
systems, was of particular concern in the U.N. General Assembly during the 
early Cold War.38 States advocating expansive interpretations of prohibited 
force that would include subversion sought to hermetically seal their domestic 
system from outside interference while still participating in the broader 
international political community. In a similar way, some states today want the 
benefits of international informational connectivity while insulating their 
computer and communication networks from outside influences or intrusions 
deemed hostile or undermining. 
Reading Article 2(4)’s prohibition of force to include such intrusion into 
another sovereign’s domain would lead to the conclusion that the fourth 
scenario above—cyber-attack—is equally prohibited as the first and third—
military attacks and covert financial intrusion.39 The second—financial 
sanctions—might be excluded from the prohibition on the ground that the 
United States has its own sovereign right to choose with whom it wants to 
conduct commerce. 
Like past efforts to define Article 2(4) “force” as coercion, efforts to 
expand its coverage beyond armed force so as to include violations of 
sovereign domain such as propaganda or political subversion never gained 
significant traction.40 Pragmatic considerations precluded the much broader 
interpretation,41 though this alternative approach raises the question of whether 
cyber-attacks might be analogized to other covert efforts, like propaganda 
campaigns, to undermine political or economic systems.42 
 
domain of others. The precise definition of this obligation is the major contribution which 
international law can make toward maintaining the peaceful co-existence of states. 
Quincy Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 521, 528 (1960). 
 38. See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, ¶¶ 1-2, U.N. GAOR, 20th 
Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 12 (Dec. 21, 1965) (“[A]ll . . . forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural 
elements, are condemned. . . . No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its 
sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.”). 
 To be sure, the United States and other states were not always completely consistent in their 
interpretations, especially in light of the geostrategic context. An early crisis for the United States 
involved alleged Yugoslavian, Albanian, and Bulgarian support for guerrilla movements inside U.S.-
allied Greece. In seeking U.N. Security Council consideration of the issue, the U.S. ambassador 
explained that “[i]nvasion by organized armies is not the only means for delivering an attack against a 
country’s independence. Force is effectively used today through devious methods of infiltration, 
intimidation and subterfuge.” U.N. SCOR, 2d Year, 147th mtg. at 1120, U.N. Doc. S/360 (1947). 
 39. Cf. Summary Records of the 56th Meeting, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 123-24, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/25 (discussing whether fomenting civil strife could constitute aggression). 
 40. Wright, supra note 37, at 529 (“It is clear that [its provisions] prohibit only the threat or 
use of armed force or an armed attack. They cannot be construed to include other hostile acts such as 
propaganda, infiltration or subversion.”). 
 41. See FRANCK, supra note 21, at 75 (“[D]uring the Cold War, a fairly bright line may be said 
to have been drawn between . . . a state’s export of revolution by direct or indirect military action . . . 
and . . . a state’s export of revolution by propaganda, cultural subversion, and other non-military 
assistance.”); Wright, supra note 37, at 529-30. 
 42. For a discussion of international law regulating covert political and economic activities, 
see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over 
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1989). 
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B. Cyber-Threats and Emergent U.S. Interpretation 
To whatever extent Article 2(4)’s meaning was settled and stable by the 
end of the Cold War, and to the extent that this meaning generally favored a 
narrow focus on military violence, cyber-warfare will challenge and test the 
Charter’s bounds. Offensive cyber-attack capabilities, such as inserting 
malicious computer code to take down public or private information systems or 
functions that rely on them, bear some similarities to kinetic military force, 
economic coercion, and subversion. At the same time, cyber-attacks also have 
unique characteristics and are evolving rapidly and in unpredictable ways. 
To deal with these challenges, some scholars and policy experts 
emphasize the need for clarity in interpreting Articles 2(4) and 51’s application 
to cyber-attacks.43 Government officials considering offensive and defensive 
options need to understand legal bounds and risks, the argument often goes.44 
Others emphasize the need for new legal instruments, reasoning that the 
ambiguity or indeterminacy of Charter provisions and jus ad bellum doctrine as 
applied in this context is best solved through more specific treaty law.45 Such 
efforts might build on the International Convention on Cybercrime, adopted in 
2001 by the Council of Europe and open to nonmember states, which requires 
parties to develop criminal laws against hacking and other illicit cyber-
activities like computer fraud.46 A new treaty might, for example, prohibit 
certain additional categories of hostile cyber-activities or provide for particular 
remedies. 
The United States government has not publicly articulated a general 
position on cyber-attacks and Articles 2(4) and 51.47 In the meantime, there is 
considerable momentum among American scholars and policy experts behind 
the idea that some cyber-attacks ought to fall within Article 2(4)’s prohibition 
of “force” or could constitute an “armed attack,” at least insofar as those terms 
should be interpreted to cover attacks with features and consequences closely 
resembling conventional military attacks or kinetic force. A National Research 
 
 43. See, e.g., LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG, SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN & KEVIN J. SOO HOO, 
INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-19 (1998); James A. Lewis, Multilateral 
Agreements To Constrain Cyberconflict, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 2010, at 16 (arguing that states 
should develop mutual understandings on “what actions can be considered a violation of sovereignty, on 
what constitutes an act of war, and what actions are seen as escalatory”). 
 44. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as 
International Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 825, 863-64 (2001). 
 45. See, e.g., ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
IN AN AGE OF CYBER INSECURITY 21-23 (2010) (recommending that the United States pursue 
international legal agreements to limit cyber-attacks); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an 
International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023 (2007) (arguing that 
new international legal regimes or instruments are needed to regulate cyber-operations); Silver, supra 
note 23, at 94 (calling for a new international convention to regulate cyber-attacks). 
 46. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, done Nov. 21, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185 
(entered into force Jan. 7, 2004). A list of Council of Europe member states as well as nonmember states 
that have signed or ratified the Convention (including the United States) is available at Convention on 
Cybercrime, CETS No.: 185, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=28/10/2010&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 23, 2011). 
 47. However, one would presume that the U.S. government’s actions are guided internally by 
legal determinations developed through the interagency process. 
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Council committee charged with studying the issue concluded that cyber-
attacks should be judged under the U.N. Charter and customary jus ad bellum 
principles by incorporating analysis of whether the effects of cyber-attacks are 
tantamount to a military attack.48 Michael Schmitt, in an influential article on 
the topic, proposes that whether a cyber-attack constitutes force depends on 
multiple factors derived from what historically made military force special in 
international law, including severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, 
measurability, and presumptive legitimacy.49 Some policy experts have come to 
similar conclusions regarding U.S. defensive doctrine against cyber-attacks, 
emphasizing that the permissibility and appropriateness of military responses to 
cyber-attacks should turn at least in part on their effects or consequences.50 
Statements by senior U.S. government officials have either hinted 
strongly that the United States would regard some cyber-attacks as prohibited 
force or declined to rule out that possibility—though the U.S. government has 
not formalized a definitive public position on the issue or articulated clear lines 
or standards.51 This suggests that at least one prong of the U.S. strategy may 
involve a classic military defense and deterrence model, in which the United 
States would consider the first use of some types of cyber-attacks generally off-
limits except in self-defense, and would consider military responses to some 
cyber-attacks by others.52 A 1999 Defense Department Assessment of 
 
 48. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 33-34; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, David 
Clark & Whitfield Diffie, Cyber Security and International Agreements, in PROCEEDINGS OF A 
WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR 
U.S. POLICY 179, 185 (2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id
=12997&page=179 (“[T]he right of states to exercise self-defense or to take countermeasures in 
response to such attacks would depend on their potential consequences.”). 
 49. See Schmitt, supra note 29, at 914-15; see also Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Self-Defense 
Against Computer Network Attack Under International Law, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 121, 140 (2002) (“[T]he 
term ‘armed attack’ may also include attacks upon computer networks solely by electronic means if the 
consequences of such attacks include either substantial harm to vital civil or military networks, or loss of 
human life, or both.”). For an Estonian view along similar lines, which is interesting because of the 
country’s experience in this area, see Erik Kodar, Computer Network Attacks in the Gray Areas of Jus ad 
Bellum and Jus in Bello, 9 BALTIC Y.B. INT’L L. 133, 139 (2009) (“The consequences of [computer 
network attacks] should be assessed case-by-case to ascertain whether they are similar to the 
consequences of an armed attack or whether consequences stay below the level of threshold for use of 
force.”). 
 50. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR 178 (2010) (proposing 
a doctrine of “cyber equivalency, in which cyber attacks are to be judged by their effects, not their 
means. They would be judged as if they were kinetic attacks, and may be responded to by kinetic 
attacks, or other means.”); Lewis, supra note 43, at 16 (“Agreement on what constitutes an act of war in 
cyberspace would be helpful. This could be defined as any action that produced an effect equivalent to 
an armed attack using kinetic weapons.”); Silver, supra note 23, at 92-93 (discussing effects-based 
analysis); David Tubbs, Perry G. Luzwick & Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Technology and Law: The 
Evolution of Digital Warfare, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 7, 15 (2002) (“Until a legal regime matures that 
comprehensively address State activities in cyberspace . . . legal advisers must principally conduct an 
effects-based analysis of international law to determine the lawfulness of State activities in 
cyberspace.”). 
 51. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNITED STATES FACES CHALLENGES IN 
ADDRESSING GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE 38-39 (2010); see also William Matthews, 
DoD Expanding Domestic Cyber Role, DEFENSENEWS (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.defensenews.com/
story.php?i=4939254&amp;c=POL&amp;s=TOP (discussing legal and conceptual uncertainties about 
cyber-attacks inside the U.S. defense establishment). 
 52. See Mark Clayton, The New Cyber Arms Race, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0307/The-new-cyber-arms-race (quoting former U.S. 
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International Legal Issues in Information Operations noted: 
If we focused on the means used, we might conclude that electronic signals 
imperceptible to human senses don’t closely resemble bombs, bullets or troops. 
On the other hand, it seems likely that the international community will be 
more interested in the consequences of a computer network attack than in its 
mechanism.53 
The report went on to suggest that cyber-attacks could constitute armed attacks 
giving rise to the right of military self-defense.54 
More recent U.S. government statements amplify that report’s logic. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2010 declared the United States’s intention 
to defend its cyber-security in terms similar to those usually used to discuss 
military security and self-defense: 
States, terrorists, and those who would act as their proxies must know that the 
United States will protect our networks. . . . [Those who] engage in cyber 
attacks should face consequences and international condemnation. In an 
interconnected world, an attack on one nation’s networks can be an attack on 
all.55 
In testifying before the Senate Committee considering his nomination to head 
the new Pentagon Cyber Command, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander 
explained that “[t]here is no international consensus on a precise definition of a 
use of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations may 
assert different definitions, and may apply different thresholds for what 
constitutes a use of force.”56 He went on to suggest, however, that “[i]f the 
President determines a cyber event does meet the threshold of a use of 
force/armed attack, he may determine that the activity is of such scope, 
duration, or intensity that it warrants exercising our right to self-defense and/or 
the initiation of hostilities as an appropriate response.”57 
 
government officials stating U.S. intentions to respond to some cyber-attack scenarios with armed 
force). 
 53. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS 18 (1999), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf, 
reprinted in 76 INT’L L. STUD. 459, 483 (2002). The document goes on to conclude: 
It is far from clear the extent to which the world community will regard computer 
network attacks as “armed attacks” or “uses of force,” and how the doctrines of self-
defense and countermeasures will be applied to computer network attacks. The outcome 
will probably depend more on the consequences of such attacks than on their 
mechanisms. 
Id. at 25; see also John Markoff, Step Taken To End Impasse Over Cybersecurity Talks, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2010, at A7 (quoting a foreign diplomat, who stated that “[t]he U.S. put forward a simple notion 
that we hadn’t said before . . . [that] [t]he same laws that apply to the use of kinetic weapons should 
apply to state behavior in cyberspace.”). 
 54. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 53, at 25. 
 55. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Newseum in Washington, 
D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. 
 56. Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA Nominee for 
Commander, United States Cyber Command: Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th Cong. 11 
(Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/04%20April/Alexander
%2004-15-10.pdf. 
 57. Id. at 12; see also Military Asserts Right To Return Cyber Attacks, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/14/ap/cabstatepent/main6394031.shtml (quoting 
Lieutenant General Alexander as asserting that while “this right has not been specifically established by 
legal precedent to apply to attacks in cyberspace, it is reasonable to assume that returning fire in 
 434 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36: 421 
 
In addition to these statements, from which we can draw some inferences 
about the U.S. government’s legal and strategic thinking, the U.S. government 
is reportedly considering a cyber-security strategy that may include preemptive 
cyber-strikes, designed under certain circumstances to knock out adversaries’ 
computer systems and networks perceived as hostile.58 This strategy suggests 
that in addition to the more traditional military defense and deterrence 
strategies just described, the U.S. government may also be considering legal 
interpretations flexible enough to permit its own offensive cyber-operations 
below a certain threshold or against inchoate hostile cyber-activities.59 
Depending on the context and details, other international legal constraints 
might come into play, though, and the United States also may be prepared in 
some cases to go beyond the lines it draws for others. For reasons discussed 
below, the U.S. government is probably concluding that it cannot rely very 
heavily on traditional forms of military deterrence. Strategies and 
accompanying interpretations that include possible preemptive cyber-
operations are a way of supplementing the United States’s defensive strategy 
with additional layers.60 
If these inferences about U.S. government strategic thinking are correct, 
the U.S. government probably prefers an effects- or consequences-based 
interpretation of “force” or “armed attack” with respect to cyber-attacks not 
only for what it includes (and therefore what the Charter prohibits and what 
could trigger self-defense rights), but also for what it excludes. Computer-based 
espionage, intelligence collection, or even some preemptive cyber-operations or 
 
cyberspace, as long as it complied with law of war principles . . . would be lawful.”). The same article 
goes on to report Lieutenant General Alexander as noting “that there is no international consensus on the 
definition of use of force, in or out of cyberspace” and that “uncertainty creates the potential for 
disagreements among nations.” Id. 
 Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been working on a joint 
approach to cyber-security, though NATO’s official rhetoric in the field of self-defense has been quite 
cautious. See North Atlantic Treaty Org., Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ¶ 19 (2010), available at http://www.nato.int/
lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf (discussing the need to develop joint policies on cyber-
defense); Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Address to Armed Forces 
Communications and Electronics Association (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www
.aco.nato.int/page27750625.aspx (asking whether NATO’s reciprocal alliance protection guarantees 
might be extended to cyber-attacks). The British government’s public posture has also been cautious 
with respect to cyber-security and issues of force, though the government declared in 2009 that “[j]ust as 
in the 19th century we had to secure the seas for our national safety and prosperity, and in the 20th 
century we had to secure the air, in the 21st century we also have to secure our advantage in cyber 
space.” U.K. OFFICE OF CYBER SEC., CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 5 (2009). 
 58. See Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Eyes Preemptive Cyber-Defense Strategy, WASH. POST, Aug. 
29, 2010, at A5; Gene J. Koprowski, Pentagon Launches Salvo in War To Protect an Army of 7 Million, 
FOXNEWS.COM (June 15, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/06/15/pentagon-cyber-
command-cyber-war/. 
 59. See Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Is Debating Cyber-Attacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2010, at 
A1 (“The Pentagon’s new Cyber Command is seeking authority to carry out computer network attacks 
around the globe to protect U.S. interests, drawing objections from administration lawyers uncertain 
about the legality of offensive operations.”). 
 60. These activities might implicate sources of international law other than the U.N. Charter, 
however, including the laws of neutrality, customary international law principles related to sovereignty, 
and rules related to countermeasures. Thus, the U.S. interpretation of Article 2(4) will not occur in a 
vacuum, and even a flexible interpretation of Article 2(4) may not leave U.S. cyber-operations 
unconstrained as a matter of international law. 
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countermeasures designed to disable an adversary’s threatening capabilities, for 
example, would generally not constitute prohibited force because these 
activities do not produce destructive consequences analogous to a kinetic 
military attack.61 Experts inside and outside the government widely agree that 
the United States is especially strong relative to other states with respect to its 
ability to penetrate and collect information from others’ systems.62 
Consequently, while very concerned about U.S. vulnerabilities to these 
activities and eager to prevent them, U.S. planners may be reluctant to draw 
boundaries too tight, lest those boundaries impede their own ability to infiltrate 
and extract information from others’ systems or to prepare to knock out hostile 
systems in advance of full-fledged attacks. Of course, efforts to draw clear lines 
between these efforts regarded as short of “force” and prohibited offensive 
attacks raise tough questions of how to measure and judge the consequences 
and causal proximity of hostile intrusions, as well as tough technical questions 
of distinguishing intelligence collection (e.g., extraction of data or mapping 
foreign information systems) from initiation of offensive operations (e.g., 
installing malicious code intended to disrupt those systems). In cyberspace, 
these activities may look identical, especially in real time.63 
The main alternatives to assessing “force” by reference to effects (or 
looking to specific sub-factors, such as magnitude, immediacy, and directness) 
have significant drawbacks. These drawbacks probably weaken their 
attractiveness to the U.S. government, though Section IV.B below highlights 
some counter-dangers often neglected in the government’s limited public 
pronouncements and by advocates of defining force in terms of its effects. 
Along a spectrum of alternatives, at one end, one might take a very legally 
restrictive view of cyber-attacks. Although I am not aware of any serious 
proposal that cyber-attacks categorically could never constitute “force” or an 
“armed attack,” some legal experts have suggested that to so qualify a cyber-
attack must produce “violent consequences.”64 Presumably, this would mean 
that causing a major power system to explode by infiltrating and disrupting its 
computer control system might constitute force or armed attack, but causing it 
to shut down by the same means—even for a long time—probably would not. 
This view places heavy emphasis on the mechanism used to produce harmful 
 
 61. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 259-61. As a general matter, international 
law has very little to say about intelligence collection. See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warefare: New 
Challenges for Public International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 275-76 (1996); see also Jeffrey H. 
Smith, State Intelligence Gathering and International Law: Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 
544 (2007) (“[B]ecause espionage is such a fixture in international affairs, it is fair to say that the 
practice of states recognizes espionage as a legitimate function of the state, and therefore it is legal as a 
matter of customary international law.”). 
 62. See Kim Zetter, Former NSA Director: Countries Spewing Cyber Attacks Should Be Held 
Responsible, WIRED (July 29, 2010, 3:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/hayden-at-
blackhat/ (quoting former NSA Director Michael Hayden as saying that “the U.S. military doesn’t 
consider intelligence attacks acts of war but the kind of ‘normal espionage thing that routinely happens 
between states,’” and that “[w]ithout going into great detail, we’re actually pretty good at this, and the 
Chinese aren’t the only ones doing this”). 
 63. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 121-126, 135-42. 
 64. See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 16, at 103 (“The crux of the matter is not the medium at 
hand . . . but the violent consequences of action taken.” (emphasis added)). 
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effects,65 and it implies that a state facing cyber-attacks could take 
countermeasures of its own against most attacks in cyberspace but could not 
resort to armed self-defense. A significant problem with this view is that in a 
world of heavy economic, political, military, and social dependence on 
information systems, the “nonviolent” harms of cyber-attacks could easily 
dwarf the “violent” ones. Consider, for example, a take-down of banking 
systems, causing cascades of financial panic, or the disabling of a power grid 
system for an extended period of time, causing massive economic disruption 
and public health emergencies.66 
At the other end of the spectrum, one might take a very broad view of 
cyber-attacks and argue that any cyber-attacks of certain types (such as those 
targeting critical infrastructure like power grids) constitute per se prohibited 
force or an armed attack.67 This interpretation is premised on the notion that 
modern society and its reliance on information systems are such that 
nonmilitary means can often cause much more harm and pose greater threats 
than military ones.68 A significant problem with this view is that it fails to draw 
a principled distinction between cyber-attacks and other nonmilitary political or 
economic interference, which can also cause significant harm.69 
The apparently emergent U.S. view lies between these positions, trying to 
account in a principled way for the destructive potential of cyber-operations 
without radically expanding the Charter’s scope. However, because the main 
bureaucratic actors have divergent policy priorities amid a rapidly evolving 
strategic environment, it probably has been and likely will remain difficult for 
the U.S. government to develop and articulate clear legal positions on what 
sorts of actions in cyberspace constitute illicit force. Some parts of the 
government prioritize the integrity of U.S. military capabilities, while others 
prioritize protecting U.S. civilian infrastructure, including that of the private 
sector; some parts seek to prevent any cyber-attacks by establishing high 
normative barriers to any hostile cyber-activity, while others seek to prevent 
cyber-attacks through preemptive cyber-attacks of their own; some parts 
prioritize intelligence collection, often involving infiltration of foreign 
computer networks and information systems, while others are focused on 
transnational law enforcement and promoting cooperation.70 Even if the United 
 
 65. See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Laws of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 87, 91 (2010). 
 66. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 253-54 (arguing that the traditional legal 
emphasis on death or physical damage is problematic because “modern society depends on the existence 
and proper functioning of an extensive infrastructure that itself is increasingly controlled by information 
technology,” and that therefore “[a]ctions that significantly interfere with the functionality of that 
infrastructure can reasonably be regarded as uses of force, whether or not they cause immediate physical 
damage”). 
 67. See, e.g., WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 140 (1999) 
(“Any computer network attack that intentionally causes any destructive effect within the sovereign 
territory of another state is an unlawful use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) that may produce 
the effects of an armed attack prompting the right of self-defense.”). Graham calls this a “strict liability” 
approach. See Graham, supra note 65, at 91. 
 68. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 101-02. 
 69. See Jensen, supra note 5, at 224-30 (discussing critiques of Sharp’s view). 
 70. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 51, at 38-39 (discussing challenges to 
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States is generally moving toward an effects-based approach to categorizing 
cyber-attacks under the U.N. Charter, these divergent policy priorities make it 
difficult to agree on how broadly or narrowly to draw legal lines, whether to 
drive toward legal clarity at all, and how actively to engage internationally on 
these points. 
C. An Interpretive Reorientation 
An approach to overcoming translation problems of Charter rules (which 
were designed to deal primarily with conventional warfare) that focuses on 
effects tantamount to a military attack and holds that cyber-attacks could 
constitute force or armed attack is not inconsistent with the narrow 
interpretations generally advocated by the United States during most of the 
Charter’s history.71 However, it does represent an argumentative reorientation, 
since for most of that history the United States was in the position of resisting 
flexible standards for understanding Article 2(4)’s scope as advocated by those 
who sought to broaden the Charter’s prohibitive scope beyond armed violence. 
As a result of networked information infrastructures and global economic 
linkages and supply chains, U.S. security planners now believe the United 
States has an interest in expanding the Charter, at least at the edges, so as to 
cover some hostile cyber-activities that might not fit within its traditional 
understandings of “force” or the triggers of self-defense rights. 
Such interpretive reorientation raises subsidiary doctrinal issues that 
might not sit comfortably with extant U.S. legal positions about the resort to 
force more generally. For example, in recent years the U.S. government has 
pushed an interpretation of anticipatory self-defense—the doctrinal notion that 
a state may resort to self-defensive force in advance of an imminent attack, 
rather than having to wait to suffer the first blow—that permits flexibility in 
assessing the “imminence” of a threat so as to take account of the difficulty of 
assessing when contemporary security threats are temporally immediate.72 If 
cyber-attacks with certain effects could give rise to rights of self-defense, could 
an impending one give rise to such a right in advance as well? Moreover, how 
would a state even assess imminence in this context?73 Anticipatory self-
defense is especially difficult to evaluate in this context because even if hostile 
cyber-attack capabilities and intentions are identified, there may be little or no 
indication of their future timing. It may also be impossible to assess their likely 
 
reaching interagency consensus on international legal issues related to cyber-operations); see also Ellen 
Nakashima, Obama To Name Former Bush, Microsoft Official as Cyber-Czar, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 
2009, at A4 (discussing challenges of interagency coordination with respect to cyber-defense and 
operations). 
 71. Cf. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362 (1963) 
(interpreting “use of force” narrowly but looking beyond immediate death or injury from physical 
impact to the destructive effects). 
 72. See Walter B. Slocombe, Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy, 45 SURVIVAL 117, 124-25 
(2003); William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 557, 557 n.1 (2003). 
 73. See generally Jensen, supra note 5, at 223-39 (discussing anticipatory self-defense 
doctrine in the context of cyber-threats); Schmitt, supra note 29, at 930-34 (same). 
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consequences in advance, because modern society’s heavy reliance on 
interconnected information systems means that the indirect secondary or 
tertiary effects of cyber-attacks may be much more consequential than the 
direct and immediate ones.74 
Historically, the restrictive U.S. interpretation of the substantive sweep of 
Article 2(4)’s prohibition and Article 51’s self-defense trigger—that they 
generally apply only to armed violence—was also often paired with a fairly 
permissive interpretation of Article 51’s magnitude threshold, that is, the 
severity of an attack or threat needed to justify armed self-defense.75 For 
example, in the Oil Platforms case before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), which concerned the legality of U.S. naval attacks against Iranian oil 
platforms in the Persian Gulf, the United States argued (unsuccessfully) for a 
low Article 51 threshold.76 The United States argued in that case that firing on 
or mining a vessel could, as a legal matter, be enough to trigger a state’s right 
of armed self-defense,77 although any force used in response would still be 
limited legally by the requirement of proportionality.78 The policy rationale 
behind the defensively permissive U.S. reading of armed attack thresholds has 
been that to impose a stricter magnitude-of-attack requirement would 
irresponsibly tie a state’s hands in the face of dangers and encourage 
antagonists to employ small-scale assaults below that floor.79 In other words, 
the U.S. position with respect to the substantive scope of Article 2(4)’s 
prohibition and Article 51’s trigger has historically been a narrow one, focused 
on armed violence, but it has simultaneously advanced a broad view of Article 
 
 74. See David Elliott, Weighing the Case for a Convention To Limit Cyberwarfare, ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 2009, at 21, 24 (“Secondary and tertiary systemic and socioeconomic effects of 
an attack will often be more important than the initial effect. Because projecting these effects requires 
difficult-to-obtain specialized knowledge of the interdependence of the systems involved, such estimates 
will be unreliable.”). 
 75. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 
89, 92-93 (1989) (“The United States has always assumed that [Articles 2(4) and 51] . . . make clear that 
‘force’ means physical violence, not other forms of coercion [and] . . . has long assumed that the 
inherent right of self defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force . . . .”); see also supra 
notes 21-22 and accompanying text (noting a widely held view that differs from that of the United 
States). 
 76. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 46-77 (Nov. 6).  
 77. Id.; see also Harvey Rishikof, When Naked Came the Doctrine of “Self-Defense”: What Is 
the Proper Role of the International Court of Justice in Use of Force Cases?, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 
341-42 (2004) (discussing U.S. government thinking regarding the necessity of an armed response 
during the tanker crisis). The U.S. view is well summarized by William H. Taft IV at the time he served 
as State Department Legal Adviser, who wrote of the Oil Platform decision: 
These statements might be read to suggest that uses of deadly force by a State’s regular 
armed forces, such as the attacks by Iran at issue in this case, do not qualify as an armed 
attack unless they reach a certain level of gravity. Such a proposition, however, would be 
inconsistent with well-settled principles of international law. 
William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 300 (2004). 
Taft further concluded: 
[T]he Court made statements that might be read as suggesting that the attacks were 
required to reach some unspecified level of gravity before they would qualify as armed 
attacks. . . . [That] proposition is [incorrect] as a matter of international law, however, and 
the United States does not interpret the opinion as relying on [it]. 
Id. at 299-300. 
 78. See Taft, supra note 77, at 303-06. 
 79. See id. at 300-01; Sofaer, supra note 75, at 93-96. 
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51 with respect to the quantum of armed violence that would trigger a right to 
self-defensive military force.80 
If the United States is reorienting its thinking about the types of actions 
that would constitute prohibited force or justify self-defensive actions 
(including military action or its own cyber-operations that others might 
consider aggressive force), one must wonder whether it might also be 
recalibrating its view of Article 51’s magnitude threshold in this particular 
context. One possibility would be for the United States to take the position that 
the magnitude of threat or damage from a cyber-attack must be high to trigger 
armed self-defense (or even constitute prohibited force), while still allowing for 
self-defensive cyber-operations as necessary countermeasures. The U.S. 
government statements referred to earlier are ambiguous on this point, but they 
could be read to suggest that only severe cyber-attacks (measured in terms of 
effect), as opposed to those causing low levels of harm, could qualify as armed 
attacks.81 This would seemingly mark an exception to the United States’s 
general position on Article 51, and therefore establish different thresholds 
based on instrument of attack: armed violence (low self-defense magnitude 
threshold) versus cyber-activities (high threshold). 
As discussed below, such a threshold differential might make sense from 
a policy perspective if the goal is to avoid crisis escalation to armed conflict, 
though a corresponding danger is that it might undermine deterrence of low-
level cyber-attacks.82 If adopted, such analytical moves would represent 
another subtle but significant interpretive adjustment of U.S. self-defense legal 
doctrine in light of technological advances. 
Another possibility is that the United States will maintain its relatively 
permissive view that a hostile use of force need not be very severe to trigger 
self-defense rights across the board, even in cyberspace. Thinking back to the 
Oil Platforms case, the United States could take the position that the cyber-
equivalent of laying sea mines would justify armed self-defense. But this then 
returns to the prior question of when a cyber-attack is legally equivalent to 
 
 80. The ICJ case Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, discussed 
infra notes 119-121 and accompanying text, is another such example. In this case, the United States 
argued that Nicaragua’s aggressive support for rebels in El Salvador triggered a right of collective 
military self-defense. The ICJ rejected that view, holding that Nicaragua’s actions were not substantial 
enough to justify a resort to armed force. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 187-200, 227-32 (June 27). 
 81. The 1999 Defense Department legal assessment offers examples of cyber-attacks that 
would likely constitute armed attacks. The harms in all those examples are hypothesized to be 
“widespread,” “seriously” threaten national security, or interfere with military operations. U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., supra note 53, at 15, 18. Lieutenant General Alexander mentioned “scope” and “intensity” as 
factors likely relevant to self-defense analysis. Alexander, supra note 56, at 12. Outside the U.S. 
government, the National Research Council Report expressly states that cyber-attacks must be severe to 
trigger self-defense, but that stems from its interpretation of Article 51, under which even kinetic 
military force only constitutes an “armed attack” if it is sufficiently severe: 
Scale of effect is one important factor in distinguishing between an armed attack and a 
use of force. For example, an armed attack would presumably involve a use of force that 
resulted in a large scale of effect. It is unclear if there are other differentiating factors in 
addition to scale of effect. 
NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 254. 
 82. See infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text. 
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force at all: when is a cyber-attack like deploying sea mines? Again, the few 
public statements by U.S. government agencies or officials are ambiguous as to 
whether severity or magnitude is an important or necessary factor in assessing 
whether cyber-attacks constitute force within the Charter’s scope; meanwhile, 
many scholarly treatments of the issue include severity or magnitude as a 
factor.83 The more important severity is to classifying cyber-attacks as force or 
armed attacks, the more distinct that analysis looks from U.S. interpretations of 
conventional military attacks, which tend not to put much weight on severity. 
 
*     *     * 
 
From a U.S. policy standpoint, answering these sorts of interpretive 
questions is important in order to plan and guide offensive and defensive 
actions,84 and it may be useful in signaling U.S. intentions. Although much 
depends on detailed analysis and application to specific fact patterns, the 
apparent trajectory of U.S. efforts—inferred from public statements to date that 
look to cyber-attacks’ effects to determine whether they cross U.N. Charter 
prohibitions or thresholds—represents a reasonable effort to translate 
foundational rules drawn up for an era of conventional warfare in physical 
space to a new era of electronic and informational warfare in cyberspace. 
However, as discussed below, it carries some strategic dangers as well.85 
International lawyers may also object that the apparent interpretive trajectory 
replaces relatively clear rules that are in many cases easy to administer 
(because armed violence is generally observable and easy to distinguish from 
other forms of interstate behavior) with less determinate, blurry tests.86 
With these questions and concerns about emerging U.S. positions in 
mind, and looking more broadly at the international legal system as a whole, 
how likely is it that emergent U.S. interpretations will take hold? Even if they 
do, how potent will the U.N. Charter be in restraining cyber-attacks? The next 
Parts take up these questions. 
III. CYBER-ATTACKS AND CHANGING MODES OF CONFLICT 
In thinking about how future modes of conflict might fit within the U.N. 
Charter legal regime, it is useful to look backward in time. Other revolutionary 
changes in the way conflict is waged strained the U.N. Charter during the Cold 
War, sometimes close to the breaking point. An examination of those changes 
 
 83. See, e.g., NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 254-56 (discussing “scale” of cyber-
attacks as a factor in assessing whether cyber-attacks constitute force); Schmitt, supra note 29, at 916-17 
(discussing severity as a factor in assessing whether cyber-attacks constitute force). 
 84. See Nakashima, supra note 58 (reporting that U.S. officials are reluctant to use cyber-
weapons until international legal questions are resolved). 
 85. See infra Section IV.B. 
 86. Fifty years ago, Ian Brownlie wrestled with this issue, too, in arguing that chemical or 
biological weapons likely could be considered force because they destroy life and property. He was 
more skeptical about whether the “release of large quantities of water down a valley, and the spreading 
of fire through a built up area or woodland across a frontier” (either of which might be thought 
analogous to some cyber-attacks) would constitute force. BROWNLIE, supra note 71, at 362-63. 
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and the legal responses to them highlights how some likely attributes of cyber-
attacks—including low visibility of offenses and responses, and difficulties in 
attributing attacks to their sources or sponsors—will undermine the Charter’s 
constraining influence in this context. 
A. Cold War Conflict and the U.N. Charter 
About midway through the Cold War, Thomas Franck famously lamented 
the “death” of Article 2(4) in the pages of the American Journal of 
International Law. He believed that rapid changes in the way conflict was 
waged had made its prohibitions of force obsolete: 
The great wars of the past, up to the time of the San Francisco Conference, 
were generally initiated by organized incursions of large military formations of 
one state onto the territory of another, incursions usually preceded by 
mobilization and massing of troops and underscored by formal declarations of 
war. Because it was so familiar to them, it was to aggression of this kind that 
the drafters of Article 51 addressed themselves. Modern warfare, however has 
inconveniently by-passed these Queensberry-like practices.87 
Small-scale wars and subversion and counter-subversion waged through local 
proxies became a common mode of superpower conflict, rather than direct 
conventional military action.88 In places such as Greece, Laos, Vietnam, and 
Lebanon, the superpowers routinely supported insurgencies, rebel movements, 
and coups against states supporting the other power with various forms of 
assistance, including arms.89 Many Latin American and African states also 
became superpower battlegrounds, fought over through insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies.90 At the same time, the swift and devastating nature of 
nuclear attacks and the development of nuclear deterrence doctrines meant that 
major powers were locked in a permanent state of threatened force.91 In both 
respects, the “technology” (broadly speaking) and strategy of conflict had 
moved in directions for which the U.N. Charter’s regulatory content and 
structure were ill equipped.92 
In retrospect, Franck was half right. Louis Henkin responded—
correctly—that Article 2(4) was battered and bruised but not killed: “[T]he 
death certificate is premature and the indictment for legicide must be redrawn 
to charge lesser though aggravated degrees of assault.”93 “Even where force is 
 
 87. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of 
Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 812 (1970); see also Michael J. Glennon, How International 
Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005) (concluding that Article 2(4) had been violated so frequently that it 
had fallen into desuetude). 
 88. Franck, supra note 87, at 812-20.  
 89. Id. at 813. 
 90. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Low-Intensity Conflict and the International Legal System, 
67 INT’L L. STUD. 25, 28 (1995). 
 91. See Franck, supra note 87, at 820.  
 92. See id. at 820-22; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 43 (July 8) (declining to hold the use or threat of using nuclear weapons to 
be per se unlawful under the U.N. Charter). 
 93. Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 544, 544 (1971).  
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used,” Henkin continued, “the fact that it is unlawful cannot be left out of 
account and limits the scope, the weapons, the duration, the purposes for which 
force is used.”94 
In other words, while it was never really likely to prevent warfare 
completely without strong supranational institutions powerful and independent 
enough to enforce it, Article 2(4)’s prohibitions may make aggression less 
likely and influence the form it takes by raising the costs of some actions. At 
minimum, the Charter’s normative principles constrain states’ actions to defend 
or advance their security interests by shaping the way those actions are justified 
publicly and perceived and measured against international community 
expectations, thereby affecting political, diplomatic, and other costs.95 Some 
scholars would go further and argue that norms regarding force have more 
significant internal pull on state decisionmaking, at least among some types of 
states.96 In any event, the Charter’s basic prohibitions had some strength and 
resilience through the Cold War because powerful states shared a collective 
interest in their vitality, especially when any conventional war had the potential 
for unlimited escalation.97  
Franck and Henkin were both correct in their approach to assessing 
Article 2(4)’s continued value. Each looked beyond the question of whether 
states used “force” at all and instead considered, first, the way that states used 
force, and second, whether Article 2(4)’s ability to impose costs on purported 
violators could keep pace with changing warfare. Indeed, the costs Article 2(4) 
imposed on conventional military attacks across borders may even have had 
substitution effects, pushing actors in the international system toward other 
modes of conflict.98 This is similar to the way the United States today may be 
pushed toward options other than military strikes in the introductory 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE 
OF LAW 103-04 (1974); Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 
699, 702-05 (2005); Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that Might Have Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 53-55 (2009). 
 96. See Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive 
War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 158 (2004). Others 
theorize that norms have greater influence on state behavior, particularly over liberal state behavior, 
when addressing issues pertaining to war and peace. See DAVID ARMSTRONG, THEO FARRELL & 
HÉLÈNE LAMBERT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 140 (2007). 
 97. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, GORDON A. CRAIG & ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, FORCE AND 
STATECRAFT 95 (4th ed. 2007) (“Every major crisis . . . always was coupled with the fear that any 
shooting war between American and Soviet forces, no matter at how modest a level initially, could 
escalate completely out of control.”). 
 98. See Alberto R. Coll, Unconventional Warfare, Liberal Democracies, and International 
Order, 67 INT’L L. STUD. 3, 3 (1992) (“The high political, military, and economic risks increasingly 
associated through the course of the twentieth century with open, conventional war have led many States 
and non-State entities to shift to other forms of violence as instruments of foreign policy.”); Alexander 
L. George & William E. Simons, Findings and Conclusions, in THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, 
supra note 36, at 267, 272 (“Covert sponsorship or encouragement of internal upheaval and irregular 
forms of aggression by others . . . makes it difficult for the defenders to clearly define the aggressive 
behavior and assign political responsibility for that behavior.”); Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, 
International Law, and the Use of Force in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression the Modern World, 67 
INT’L L. STUD. 43, 60 (1992) (“[T]he low-intensity conflict scenario is selected because it provides a 
colorable claim of legitimacy (being less obvious).”). 
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hypothetical, and the way Stuxnet malware was probably used to attack Iran’s 
nuclear program as a substitute for military options.99 That is, by heavily 
regulating some modes of conflict but not others, the law may have pushed 
antagonists toward the latter. 
As information technology opens up new modes of interstate conflict, 
questions for cyber-warfare include the following: can Article 2(4)’s contours 
adjust to cyber-capabilities in ways that differentiate illicit conduct from legal 
activities? Can those changes help impose costs for noncompliance? And in 
doing so, can they command the respect and support of powerful actors in the 
international system? 
B. Legal Process, Enforcement Challenges, and “Technologies” of 
Conflict 
The Cold War history of Article 2(4) teaches several lessons about the 
effect of new technologies on waging and regulating conflict. First, as new 
technologies of conflict develop, reaching broad international consensus on 
interpretation of the U.N. Charter may be slow and difficult. Second, some 
technologies or modes of conflict will be especially challenging to regulate 
because their features match poorly with the general enforcement mechanisms 
of the law regulating force.100 These mechanisms sometimes include U.N. 
Security Council processes or other U.N. organs, but more often involve 
decentralized assessments and evaluations by states, international institutions, 
and other influential international actors. As Michael Reisman puts it: 
International law is still largely a decentralized process, in which much 
lawmaking (particularly for the most innovative matters) is initiated by 
unilateral claim, whether explicit or behavioral. Claims to change inherited 
security arrangements . . . ignite a process of counterclaims, responses, replies, 
and rejoinders until stable expectations of right behavior emerge.101 
One reason why cyber-attacks will be difficult to regulate through such 
processes is that the factual bases for asserting or contesting a violation of 
Article 2(4) or a right of armed self-defense under Article 51 will be subject to 
great uncertainty, debate, opacity, and lack of verifiability.102 There are 
technical, legal, and political or strategic reasons for these difficulties. 
As a technical matter, those who study the problem of legally regulating 
cyber-attacks are usually quick to point out the problems of identification and 
attribution: it is not always possible to discern quickly or accurately who 
launched or directed an attack.103 The nature of digital information 
 
 99. According to former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker, “It’s the first time we’ve 
actually seen a weapon created by a state to achieve a goal that you would otherwise have used multiple 
cruise missiles to achieve.” Christopher Dickey et al., The Shadow War, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 20, 2010, at 
28, 31 (quoting Stewart Baker). 
 100. See Schachter, supra note 24, at 1645-46; Waxman, supra note 95, at 53-55. 
 101. W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims To Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 
82 (2003). 
 102. For a general discussion of proof standards and self-defense amid factual uncertainty about 
threats, see Waxman, supra note 95, at 57-77. 
 103. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 138-41, 252; Hollis, supra note 45, at 
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infrastructure facilitates anonymity, and adversaries can route their attacks 
through others’ computer systems. Meanwhile, forensics are such that it may be 
very difficult to link a penetration or disruption of a computer or information 
networks to the responsible party, though forensic capabilities are generally 
improving, albeit unevenly across states.104 Even if individual perpetrators can 
be identified, it may be difficult to substantiate as a matter of fact on whose 
behalf they are operating. 
These technical issues are exacerbated by jurisdictional concerns. There 
are jurisdictional limits on any state’s ability to investigate beyond its own 
borders—an especially daunting problem when electronic attacks can include 
transit computers and networks spanning dozens of countries.105 As one early 
study of this problem put it, “Investigators tracing attacks across computer 
networks may be stymied by a collision between fundamental principles of 
physics and those of international law, namely that electrons may flow through 
networks freely across international borders, but the authority of agents of 
national governments does not.”106 
Moreover, even if investigation processes can trace a cyber-attack back 
through digital networks to its source, it may be difficult to publicize that 
information in a timely and convincing way, especially when states or private 
entities are likely to have strong incentives not to discuss the technical details 
of informational security breaches or reveal their own capabilities to 
adversaries or third parties.107 As a case in point, the U.S. government waited 
two years before disclosing that in 2008 it suffered “the most significant breach 
of U.S. military computers ever” when a flash drive inserted into a U.S. 
military laptop surreptitiously introduced malware into the Pentagon’s 
classified and unclassified computer systems.108 Even then, the U.S. 
government disclosed few details about the extent of harm and said nothing 
about its knowledge of the likely perpetrators.109 Iran has likewise been very 
reticent about Stuxnet, its effects, and Iran’s knowledge of the code’s source.110 
 
1031-32; see also Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 26-33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670330& 
(discussing the attribution problem). 
 104. For a discussion of the attribution challenges specific to different types of cyber-attacks, 
including Internet-based attacks, non-Internet cyber-attacks, and threats of malicious code inserted into 
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Sci. and Tech., 111th Cong. (July 15, 2010) (statement of Robert K. Knake, Int’l Aff. Fellow in 
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 105. See KNAKE, supra note 45, at 16 (“Whereas national legal authority is bounded by borders, 
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 106. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 43, at 23. 
 107. See NRC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 138-41. 
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 109. See Ellen Nakashima, Defense Official Discloses Cyberattack, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 
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Others have noted that the attribution challenges of cyber-attacks pose 
problems for deterrence (because if you cannot identify the perpetrators, you 
cannot threaten them)111 and for enforcing the law (because you cannot hold 
unidentifiable perpetrators accountable).112 In addition to those problems, the 
argument here goes further. Attribution challenges—both the technical aspects 
and the ability to make those findings public in a credible, persuasive way—as 
well as the secrecy and low visibility of some states’ responsive actions in 
cyberspace, pose challenges for the substantive development of the law. It will 
be difficult to develop consensus understandings even of the fact patterns on 
which states’ legal claims and counterclaims are based, assuming those claims 
are leveled publicly at all. 
Put another way, the ability to determine the ultimate perpetrator and 
sponsor of cyber-attacks may be necessary to take effective defensive or 
deterrent action, to satisfy a state’s legal obligations internally, and to justify a 
state’s responses externally. However, the level of certainty a state requires 
internally may be different than the level of certainty needed to justify 
responses externally. 
A separate but related problem is the uncertainty of causation, or how to 
ascribe harms of cyber-attacks. For example, if state A disrupts the information 
network of state B’s stock market, resulting in a massive decline in investor 
confidence with unpredictable ripple effects throughout B’s economy, what 
portion of the ensuing harm ought to be legally attributed to A’s actions for jus 
ad bellum purposes? As discussed earlier, modern society’s heavy reliance on 
interconnected information systems means that the indirect and secondary 
effects of cyber-attacks may be much more consequential than the direct and 
immediate ones.113 Once state B takes defensive and perhaps offensive 
countermeasures in cyberspace, it may be especially difficult to untangle the 
strands of fact, associate them with specific effects, and assign them clear legal 
significance. Consider the opening hypothetical: if the United States 
electronically disrupted Iran’s banking system, which harms that followed—
perhaps days or weeks later—could be ascribed legally to those actions, 
especially in the context of other overt efforts to weaken Iran’s economy with 
economic sanctions and Iran’s own responsive actions? 
Again, though, these are not entirely new problems for Article 2(4); the 
issues of attribution and causality arose many times in Cold War era Article 
2(4) debates. As Franck explained, “The small-scale and diffuse but significant 
and frequent new wars of insurgency have, by their nature, made clear-cut 
distinctions between aggression and self-defense, which are better adapted to 
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conventional military warfare, exceedingly difficult.”114 Moreover: 
While it was not always possible even in classical combat to determine which 
army had started marching first, the scale, formations and strategy of 
conventional warfare did make the identification of aggression relatively easy. 
It stretched everyone’s credulity to be told that Poland had attacked Germany or 
South Korea the North, when the armies of these self-proclaimed victims were, 
right at the very beginning, to be seen as overrunning their opponents. . . . With 
the hit-and-run tactics of wars of national liberation, on the other hand, it is 
often difficult even to establish convincingly, from a pattern of isolated, 
gradually cumulative events, when or where the first round began, let alone at 
whose instigation, or who won it.115 
Whereas conventional wars or attacks of the past were usually easily visible 
and measurable, unconventional or low-intensity conflict featured inconclusive 
evidence of foreign involvement or hostile action, and foreign state antagonists 
worked to mask, conceal, or obscure their participation and responses.116 In 
other words, once conflict was waged through proxies, it was difficult to 
develop international consensus about the relevant facts on such basic issues as 
what occurred and on whose behalf, let alone consensus about jus ad bellum 
responsibility or justification.117 
Such legal-factual murkiness helps explain why Article 2(4) seemed 
unable to address that form of conflict and why that mode of conflict offered an 
appealing option to the Cold War antagonists.118 Perhaps to try to bring greater 
legal clarity and predictability to this situation, the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United 
States,119 in holding that the United States had violated international law in 
supporting Contra guerrillas and mining Nicaragua’s harbors, imposed high 
bars on the level of violence necessary to constitute an “armed attack” and the 
level of state control over foreign agents necessary to warrant attribution of 
their illicit actions.120 In so doing, the ICJ rejected the United States’s claim 
that it had acted in collective self-defense of El Salvador, responding to 
Nicaragua’s alleged support for rebels there. But, while these doctrinal 
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approaches may have made sense to a court trying to articulate standards that 
would constrict opportunities for states to militarily escalate conflict, they did 
little to address the underlying challenges of contemporary interstate conflict 
being waged through surrogates and unconventional means, and may have even 
contributed to them.121 
Like these prior proxy wars, cyber-conflict is likely to feature disputed 
facts about what exactly occurred, including who committed the electronic 
disruption and on whose behalf they did it.122 In some respects, those problems 
will likely be vastly exacerbated in the cyber-context because of participants’ 
greater ability to mask or anonymize their identity and because the 
“movements” and “terrain” of cyber-warfare can be dispersed across global 
information networks and will often be carried out on private infrastructure.123 
“While in most conflicts, both sides claim that they are acting in self-defense, 
cyber-conflicts are a particularly messy domain in which to air and judge such 
claims.”124 
Consider again the case of Estonia, referenced earlier,125 in which 
information about the source of attacks on Estonian computer networks took 
months to compile, and many key facts—including ultimate responsibility for 
directing or encouraging the attacks—remain subject to dispute.126 Evidence of 
Russian government involvement was mostly circumstantial, the compromised 
computers that were harnessed remotely for the attack were located on several 
different continents, and Russian officials denied involvement.127 There is also 
evidence suggesting that the Russian government may have encouraged 
nongovernmental “patriotic hackers”128 to conduct attacks, and that China is 
similarly relying on unofficial, semi-private hackers to maintain deniability.129 
Utilizing loosely or ambiguously affiliated actors resembles the way Cold 
War superpowers relied on surrogate forces, though this time arrayed across 
cyberspace rather than third-party territories.130 Like proxy warfare, the factual 
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haziness surrounding cyber-attacks—and therefore the difficulty in reaching 
agreement on legal appraisal—may make cyber-attacks an appealing weapon to 
some states.131 
 
*     *     * 
 
To an even greater degree than the proxy warfare of the Cold War, cyber-
warfare may lack clearly discernable starting points and readily observable or 
provable actions and counter-actions.132 This does not mean that legal line 
drawing through U.N. Charter interpretation or new international legal 
agreements is impossible with respect to issues of prohibited attacks and self-
defense. It does mean, however, that while information technology continues to 
evolve at faster and faster rates, the processes of claims and counterclaims 
moving toward a predictable, stable outcome, or the accretion of interpretive 
practice commanding broad consensus, will likely be slow and uncertain. 
IV. THE LAW OF CYBER-WARFARE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 
Besides the specific challenges of regulating certain types of conflict, 
Cold War experience with U.N. Charter interpretation illustrates important 
principles about the relationship between law and power that are applicable to a 
discussion of cyber-capabilities. Competing interpretations of Articles 2(4) and 
51 have always reflected distributions of power. As a corollary, efforts to revise 
legal boundaries and thresholds may have re-allocative effects on power by 
raising or lowering the costs of using resources and capabilities that are 
unequally apportioned.133 
The United States appears to be placing its legal bets on a future world in 
which it can continue to rely partly on its comparative military edge to deter 
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cyber-attacks while supplementing that deterrence with its own offensive, 
defensive, and preemptive cyber-capabilities—a bet that plays to some 
advantages but also carries risks. Reaching legal consensus with other major 
powers on these issues will be difficult in part because they perceive a different 
combination of strategic risks and opportunities. Therefore, U.S. policymakers 
should prepare to operate in a highly contested and uncertain international legal 
environment. 
A. Cold War Power Relations and the U.N. Charter 
As discussed above, a major Cold War legal dispute about Article 2(4)—
one pitting groupings of the world’s states against each other—concerned 
whether Article 2(4) bans aggressive military violence only, or whether it also 
covers other forms of coercion, including economic coercion. Some states,134 
along with a few notable international law scholars,135 argued that Article 2(4) 
prohibited a much broader category of coercion than just military force. 
However, this broader position never gained traction as a matter of 
authoritative practice; the more restrictive interpretation confined to military 
means won out. 
From the perspective of the United States, this seemed like a good 
bargain: the costs placed by international law on states of resorting first to 
conventional armed force in a crisis were high, thereby generally helping to 
preserve territorial stability and prevent escalation.136 In the meantime, the 
United States could build its defenses, grow its economy, and expand its 
influence, all the while relatively free to use its disproportionate economic and 
diplomatic muscle to pressure smaller states without the fear of reciprocal 
coercion.137 (This was the case at least until the Arab states launched an oil 
embargo in 1973, at which moment that deal may not have seemed so 
favorable.)138 
In short, where one stands on interpreting Articles 2(4) and 51 has 
historically depended on one’s share of global resources and power, including 
whether one is satisfied or unsatisfied with the status quo.139 Moreover, those 
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with more power have greater ability to impose their preferred interpretation. 
As Julius Stone observed of the U.N. Charter in 1977: 
Against the bench-mark of existing international law, particular offered 
definitions may tend to preserve the status quo of distribution. Or they may 
drive drastically to change or revolutionise this distribution. From the 
standpoint of proponents of a particular content, it is likely to favour the status 
quo as to those resources in which the proponent is affluent; and to support 
change or revolution as to those of which it regards itself as deprived. What an 
offered definition with any substantive content can rarely be, is merely neutral 
about the disposal of world resources.140 
Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, whose policy-oriented approach to 
global public order also emphasized a broader interpretation of legal 
prohibitions than did more mechanical or formalist accounts,141 also 
emphasized the relationship between power distribution and prohibited force 
line drawing. Specifically, they stressed that difficulties in distinguishing 
lawful from unlawful coercion are “greatly magnified in the global community 
by gross inequalities in the distribution of effective power.”142 
B. Technology, Power Shifts, and the Strategic Logic of Legal 
Interpretation 
With these relationships between law and power in mind, the United 
States has an interest in regulating cyber-attacks, but it will be difficult to 
achieve such regulation through international use-of-force law or through new 
international agreements to outlaw types of cyber-attacks.143 That is because 
the distribution of emerging cyber-capabilities and vulnerabilities—
vulnerabilities defined not only by the defensive capacity to block actions but 
also by the ability to tolerate and withstand attacks—is unlikely to correspond 
to the status quo distribution of power built on traditional measures like 
military and economic might. 
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It is not surprising that the United States seems inclined toward an 
interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 that allows it to classify some offensive 
cyber-attacks as prohibited “force” or an “armed attack” but does not otherwise 
move previously drawn lines to encompass economic coercion or other means 
of subversion in that classification. Nor is it surprising to see the United States 
out in front of other states on this issue. The power and vulnerability 
distribution that accompanies reliance on networked information technology is 
not the same as past distributions of military and economic power, and perhaps 
not to the United States’s advantage relative to rivals. Moreover, some U.S. 
strengths are heavily built on digital interconnectedness and infrastructure that 
is global, mostly private, and rapidly changing; these strengths are therefore 
inextricably linked to new and emerging vulnerabilities.144 
Although some experts assess that the United States is currently strong 
relative to others in terms of offensive capabilities,145 several factors make the 
United States especially vulnerable to cyber-attack, including the informational 
and electronic interconnectedness of its military and public and private sectors, 
and political obstacles to curing some of these vulnerabilities through 
regulation.146 As the Obama administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy 
acknowledged: 
The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those 
who would disrupt and destroy. They enable our military superiority . . . . Our 
daily lives and public safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential 
adversaries could use cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive 
scale.147 
In other words, U.S. technological strengths create corresponding exposures to 
threats. 
The U.S. government is especially constrained politically and legally in 
securing its information infrastructure—which is largely privately held or 
privately supplied—against cyber-threats, and these constraints shape its 
international strategy. Proposals to improve cyber-security through regulation 
include promulgating industry standards to enhance the security of information 
technology products and protect networks and computers from intrusion, and, 
more invasively, expanding the government’s authority to monitor information 
systems and communications.148 Such proposals invariably face powerful 
antiregulatory industry pressures and heightened civil liberties sensitivities.149 
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Information technology industry groups and privacy organizations have 
together pushed back against moves to impose government security mandates 
and against more intrusive government cyber-security activities, arguing that 
they would stifle innovation, erode civil liberties, and fail to keep up with 
rapidly evolving threats amid a globalized economy.150 A reluctance to secure 
information systems domestically through government regulation then elevates 
U.S. government reliance on other elements of a defensive strategy. 
In that light, U.S. legal interpretations and declaratory postures that define 
prohibited force in ways that extend narrow Charter interpretations to take 
account of cyber-warfare may be seen as part of an effort to sustain a legal 
order in which anticipated U.S. military and economic moves and 
countermoves against potential adversaries fit quite comfortably—that is, a 
legal order that preserves U.S. comparative advantages. In extending the 
foundational U.N. Charter prohibition on force to cyber-attacks by emphasizing 
their comparable effects to conventional military attacks, such interpretations 
help deny that arsenal to others by raising the costs of its use. At the same time, 
by casting that prohibition and complementary self-defense authority in terms 
that help justify military force in response, this interpretation reduces the costs 
to the United States of using or threatening to use its vast military edge (and it 
helps signal a willingness to do so). 
Put another way, the United States appears to be placing hedged bets 
about what the future strategic environment will look like and how best to 
position itself to operate and compete in it. On balance, for example, the United 
States may prefer relatively clear standards with respect to cyber-actions that 
have immediate destructive effects—at least clear enough to justify armed 
response or deterrence to activities or scenarios deemed threatening—while at 
the same time preferring some permissive haziness with respect to intelligence 
collection and its own countermeasures in cyberspace. Such a posture allows 
the United States to protect itself from hostile penetrations while also 
preserving some latitude for those activities in which it may be relatively 
strong.151 Internally, that clarity facilitates planning for contingencies and 
deliberation about options;152 externally, it may help articulate and deter the 
crossing of red lines.153 
In trying to explain what may be driving the U.S. interpretation, this 
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Article is neither affirming nor denying this strategic logic, which is contingent 
on future capabilities and vulnerabilities that are both highly uncertain and 
shrouded in secrecy. Rather, it is trying to uncover and scrutinize some of the 
underlying assumptions. 
There are several strategic reasons for the United States to be cautious in 
considering interpretations that expand narrow definitions of “force” and 
“attack” so that they include potentially broad categories of cyber-attacks—
risks that are often not acknowledged or addressed in discussions of the U.S. 
interpretive trajectory. For one thing, the United States has generally defeated 
efforts by other states to interpret Articles 2(4) and 51 expansively to include 
economic coercion and other forms of political subversion.154 In thinking about 
the Charter regime as a whole, therefore, the United States may not want to 
reopen those debates. Cyber-attacks can allow state and nonstate actors to 
inflict massive harm without resort to arms, but that has long been true of many 
other instruments, including economic and financial means, covert subterfuge, 
and other widely used instruments. In that regard, one advantage of promoting 
legal regulation of cyber-attacks through a new treaty or international 
agreement instead of through Charter interpretation is that such efforts would 
have little if any effect on broader Charter law. An advantage, however, to 
working through Charter interpretation rather than new agreements is that 
Charter law can evolve incrementally and begin shaping international actors’ 
expectations through unilaterally initiated state practice without having to reach 
consensus (the difficulties of which are discussed in the next Section). 
Depending on the relative risk of different types of future cyber-attack 
scenarios, it might also be in the United States’s strategic interest to legally de-
link cyber-activities from armed force instead of defining force by reference to 
effects, or at least to impose extremely high legal thresholds for treating cyber-
attacks equivalent to force or armed attack, in order to reduce the chances of 
military escalation from cyber-activities.155 As capabilities proliferate among 
state and nonstate actors to conduct various sorts of malicious, hostile, or 
intelligence-gathering activities in cyberspace, any normative constraints that 
come from treating some cyber-attacks as force prohibited by Article 2(4) and 
any deterrence value of treating them as armed attacks triggering self-defense 
rights under Article 51 might be outweighed by the dangers of lowering legal 
barriers to military force in a wider range of circumstances.156 That is, the value 
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of promoting a right of armed self-defense against cyber-attacks may turn out 
to be quite low—since, among other things, it may be difficult to sufficiently 
prove one’s case publicly in justifying military responses—while doing so may 
introduce greater security instability to the international system by eroding 
normative constraints on military responses to nonmilitary harms.157 
As the following Section explores, it is very difficult to assess these risk 
balances because the global security environment is shifting dramatically and 
unpredictably. Moreover, even if the United States could assess the risks 
accurately, other states may be operating under different sets of strategic 
assumptions about that future. 
C. Divergent Interests and Implications for Charter Interpretation 
Assuming the United States decides firmly on a legal interpretation going 
forward, the redrawing of legal lines on a map of inequitably distributed power 
and vulnerabilities would create winners and losers and would make it difficult 
to reach agreement on new legal boundaries, whether through interpretive 
evolution of the U.N. Charter or new conventions.158 In thinking about legal 
interpretations of Articles 2(4) and 51, success therefore depends on the ability 
of proponents to articulate and defend their legal lines using combinations of 
traditional and new forms of power for deterrence, self-defense, enforcement, 
and influence. 
Again, one should not divorce analysis of any proposed content of 
Articles 2(4) and 51 from the processes by which it is interpreted, reinterpreted, 
enforced, and reinforced.159 The likely factual ambiguity surrounding cyber-
attacks and the pressures to take aggressive responsive or escalatory measures 
more quickly than those facts can be resolved may sometimes require strategic 
and military decisionmaking amid legal gray zones. Moreover, as involved 
states marshal their arguments amid these moves and countermoves, and as 
they consider their long-term interests, they may also calculate differently what 
Stone calls “the expected value . . . of built-in [legal] ambiguities as future 
political weapons.”160 
That is, even if states widely share a common, minimum interest in 
restricting some cyber-attacks, states may have divergent interests regarding 
specific substantive content as well as the desired degree of clarity in the law. 
Salient differences will likely stem from asymmetries of geostrategic 
ambitions, internal and external commitment to legal norms generally, and the 
 
sovereignty, on what constitutes an act of war, and what actions are seen as escalatory, could reduce the 
potential for cyberwar.”). 
 157. An alternative is to interpret Article 2(4)’s prohibitions of “force” to include some cyber-
attacks based on their effects but to interpret Article 51’s self-defense “armed attack” trigger narrowly, 
to exclude cyber-attacks. Cf. Schmitt, supra note 29, at 928-29 (arguing that if Article 2(4) is interpreted 
to include cyber-attacks it would be prudent to narrowly interpret states’ right to armed self-defense 
against them). 
 158. See Goldsmith, supra note 112, at 26. 
 159. See supra Section III.B. 
 160. STONE, supra note 34, at 242. 
 2011] Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force 455 
  
nature and extent of public-private institutional relationships.161 
In contrast to the United States, some states that are developing offensive 
cyber-warfare capabilities (such as North Korea, according to many experts) 
are non-status-quo powers or aspiring regional powers,162 and they may prefer 
legal ambiguity as to cyber-attacks or narrow interpretations of Article 51 that 
would allow them—if they resort to cyber-attacks—to portray themselves as 
victims of any responsive military strikes.163 Offensive cyber-capabilities have 
the potential to shift or upset international balances of power, because some 
states are more vulnerable than others to cyber-attack (in terms of capacity to 
block actions as well as to tolerate or withstand them), and attacks could have a 
disproportionately large impact on countries or militaries that have a higher 
reliance on networked information systems.164 Developing an offensive cyber-
warfare capability is likely to be less expensive in resources and diplomatic 
costs than competing economically or militarily with much stronger states, 
though legal flexibility or constraints could alter that calculus.165 On the other 
hand, some small states that are unlikely to develop sophisticated offensive or 
defensive systems may advocate international legal interpretations or new 
agreements that are very restrictive of cyber-attacks and define attacks broadly, 
 
 161. See generally DANIEL L. BYMAN & MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF 
COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY MIGHT (2002) (arguing that 
power relations shape constraints, including legal and diplomatic, under which states can use or threaten 
force). Internally, some U.S. government officials bristle at what they see as overly restrictive legal 
constraints. See Nakashima, supra note 59. 
 162. See Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Cyberattacks Jam Government and Commercial 
Web Sites in U.S. and South Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at A4. Admiral Mike McConnell, the 
former Director of National Intelligence and Director of the NSA, stated: 
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either take the cold of winter or the heat of summer, I probably would sack electric power 
on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt to cause a cascading effect. 
All of those things are in the art of the possible from a sophisticated attacker. 
Quoted in Cyber War: Sabotaging the System, CBS NEWS (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2009/11/06/60minutes/main5555565.shtml. 
 163. Consider, by way of analogy, the Oil Platforms case, discussed supra notes 77-79 and 
accompanying text. 
 164. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 50, at 259 (“The asymmetry of what it costs to counter 
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. . . .”); Peter Apps, Iran “Attack” Points to Rising Cyber Warfare Risk, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68N45Q20100924 (“[C]yber warfare is seen as a particularly 
appealing option for countries that remain far outmatched by the conventional military might of the U.S. 
North Korea is seen as having particular advantages in any cyber confrontation—its own national 
computer infrastructure is so outdated that there would be little if anything for South Korea or U.S. 
cyber warfare experts to counter-attack against.”); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/64/129 (July 8, 2009) (statement of Kazakhstan) (arguing that the 
lack of consensus on international approaches to regulating cyber-warfare “can be explained by the 
technological gap between the most and the least develop countries, latent political differences and 
conflicting ways of assessing developments and events in cyberspace”). For views more skeptical that 
cyber-capabilities will radically alter power balances, see generally MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CONQUEST IN 
CYBERSPACE (2007); and GREGORY J. RATTRAY, STRATEGIC WARFARE IN CYBERSPACE (2001). 
 165. See STEWART BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS 218-20 (2010); see also U.N. Secretary-
General, supra note 164, at 3 (statement of Brazil) (“The efficiency of this form of warfare is increased 
by the fact that relatively small investments are required to develop many of those capabilities.”). 
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seeing themselves as highly reliant on protective norms.166 Individually, 
though, they will have little power to promote those principles. 
Like the United States, other major actors may have much to lose from 
cyber-attacks. However, they may calculate their short- and long-term strategic 
interests with respect to cyber-warfare and its regulation differently than the 
United States, in light of their own matrix of offensive and defensive 
capabilities, public-private institutional relationships, and asymmetries in the 
ways international law constrains different actors.167 Russia, for example, has 
proposed to the United Nations a draft statement of principles that would 
prohibit the development, creation, and use of cyber-attack tools. Meanwhile, 
though, Russia is engaged in developing cyber-attack capabilities,168 and some 
analysts are skeptical of Russia’s sincerity in proposing cyber-arms control 
agreements, especially given the difficulties of verifying them.169 China likely 
sees cyber-warfare capabilities as a way of equalizing the conventional military 
superiority of the United States,170 so it may be reluctant to concede legally 
“disarming” interpretations, at least without some reciprocal benefit or legal 
concession. Russia and China, which, as mentioned earlier, both reportedly 
exploit informal relationships with private actors (i.e., “citizen hackers”) to 
conduct attacks and collect intelligence in cyberspace, may also incline toward 
legal doctrine that makes it difficult to impute private cyber-actions to 
governments.171 Meanwhile, some European states have approached the legal 
relationship between cyber-attacks and force cautiously, perhaps because of 
general concerns about military escalation of crises and divergent strategic 
assessments among themselves.172 
Differences in internal politics, ideology, and government control over 
information will also shape state interests in competing interpretations of 
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Charter norms. With echoes of debates from prior eras,173 various types of 
states are likely to view cyber-threats differently and to distinguish offensive 
attacks from defensive measures differently. For instance, some states that 
tightly control information, including major powers like China, are especially 
concerned about internal political dissent and might therefore define what the 
United States sees as “Internet freedom” as a threat to vital security interests. 
Efforts to crack down on what they (or other states that exercise strong state 
control over Internet content) may view as defensive measures against hostile 
subversion may be viewed by the United States (or other states that value and 
promote free speech) as hostile, offensive measures.174 It is hard to envision a 
state in China’s position strongly endorsing or standing behind U.S. visions for 
international legal regulation of cyber-attacks without some unlikely 
concessions by the United States.175 
From a policy standpoint, this should sound another cautionary note about 
efforts to build international legal consensus about cyber-attacks and the use of 
force, whether through Charter interpretation or new agreements. Emergent 
U.S. government inclinations toward effects-based interpretations of the 
Charter may be legally reasonable and protective of some core U.S. interests, as 
well as widely shared foreign interests. But even if they help in the short term 
to manage competing risks of too much or too little authority to employ cyber-
attacks, or too much or too little leeway to resort to armed self-defense in 
response, a coherent legal strategy can only be forged and advanced in the long 
term if it is integrated effectively with broader diplomacy and security strategy, 
including efforts to build and sustain offensive, defensive, deterrent, and 
intelligence capabilities—while others do the same based on a different set of 
objectives, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and constraints. 
 
*     *     * 
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As the opening U.S.-Iran hypothetical as well as early Cold War legal 
debates demonstrate, the policy imperative to align legal moves with broader 
strategy has long existed with respect to other inequitably distributed forms of 
strength and vulnerability, including military might, economic prowess, and 
surreptitious political influence. Since the Charter’s creation, the United States, 
like its partners and rivals, has pursued an international legal strategy in the 
context of grand geopolitics, resulting in a dynamic interplay of law and power: 
states’ instruments for exerting power and their vulnerabilities to them shape 
their approaches to legal interpretation, while legal constraints in turn affect the 
instruments of statecraft and vulnerabilities. 
The same policy imperatives hold with respect to the United States’s 
ability to compete in an emergent cyber-security environment likely to include 
powerful actors with divergent interests and those who would violate whatever 
legal lines begin to emerge,176 and a world in which rapidly developing 
technology will reshape the nature and distribution of power.177 The 
prescription is not to abandon interpretive or multilateral legal efforts to 
regulate cyber-attacks, but to recognize their likely limits and to consider the 
implications of legal proposals or negotiations in the context of a future 
security environment that is shifting radically and fraught with uncertainties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Cyber-attacks pose difficult line-drawing problems, but we must avoid 
missing the strategic forest in thinking about the legal trees. Some problems of 
cyber-warfare for regulating force are at the same time unique yet familiar. 
Viewing these questions in the context of Cold War debates about the U.N. 
Charter and its prohibition of “force” highlights that although the technology of 
conflict—both in terms of capabilities and probable vulnerabilities—is 
changing in revolutionary ways, many of the interrelated strategic and legal 
challenges that arise are not new. 
Legal line drawing with respect to the U.N. Charter and use of force 
norms creates geostrategic winners and losers, so debates about Charter 
interpretation have always reflected distributions of power and vulnerability. 
That lesson helps to explain what appears to be the emergent—though not yet 
formalized and publicized—U.S. legal orientation on cyber-attacks, as well as 
some of the nascent re-posturing from the standard American stance on the use 
of force through much of the Charter’s history. 
Even if the U.S. government’s assumptions about threats and conflict 
bear out in an uncertain future, other major state actors in this area are likely to 
have different views on legal line drawing because they perceive a different set 
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of strategic risks and opportunities. It will therefore be difficult to reach 
interpretive agreement. Moreover, particular characteristics of cyber-attacks—
including the low visibility of attacks and counter-actions, likely disputes about 
key facts, and difficulties in establishing attribution and causation—will make 
it especially difficult to build legal consensus around the U.S. position. For the 
foreseeable future, the United States will have to pursue its offensive and 
defensive strategy on an uncertain and unstable international legal terrain. 
 
